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1. Introduction  
This policy paper is part of an extended research project examining the impact upon Northern 
Ireland of the UK’s changing relationship with Europe.1 With October 2017 witnessing the 
beginning of consideration of amendments to the EU Withdrawal Bill and the culmination of 
efforts to address aspects of Brexit affecting the island of Ireland in Phase 1 of the UK’s 
withdrawal negotiations this paper is intended to focus on some of the emerging issues for 
Northern Ireland as the contours of Brexit become increasingly defined.  
This paper is based on two considerations. First the UK Government maintains that the UK will 
not be part of the existing EU customs union (EUCU) or indeed the Single Market after Brexit. 
Second, the EU’s proposal for a form of special status for Northern Ireland which moves the 
customs border to the Irish Sea has been rejected as both undermining the UK’s Union and 
creating a barrier to trade within the UK. If neither of these premises change then they will 
almost invariably create considerable friction at the Northern Ireland/Ireland border. The UK 
Government’s goal of establishing a bespoke trading arrangement with the EU which allows it 
to strike wide-ranging trade deals with non-EU countries, and its goal of minimising disruption 
at the Northern Ireland/Ireland border are incompatible. 
In light of these premises, certain aspects of international law will likely come to play an 
increasingly prominent role in policy making within UK institutions affecting Northern Ireland. 
First, some aspects of international law have for many decades been mediated through the EU, 
such as trade law, and will once again need to be managed by the UK Government. Second, 
some of the UK’s international law obligations have been negotiated, implemented and 
interpreted in light of the UK’s EU membership in its negotiation, including aspects of the Good 
Friday/Belfast Agreement (GFA) and the Common Travel Area.  
2. The Brave New World of the Common Travel Area 
An assumption abounds that the Common Travel Area (CTA) resolves a lot of problems at the 
Ireland/Northern Ireland border after Brexit, but the UK Governent’s position paper 
acknowledges that the CTA will not, of itself, secure a friction-free border.2 The CTA, which (as 
is repeatedly stated) pre-dates EU membership, is based on the idea that the UK and the 
Republic can decide for themselves who their citizens are and who the people are who they 
treat like citizens (but who technically are not). So, this enables Irish citizens in the UK and vice 
versa to carry on their lives as if they are citizens of each country. This has been the case since 
the foundation of the Free State. However, this does not cover trade in goods or services. 
So, while the CTA resolves, partially, an immigration question it does not resolve the customs 
issue. The Common Travel Area is not a common trade area, let alone a common market. 
A further critical point is, of course, that we cannot return to the CTA as it was in 1973. The 
Republic of Ireland is in a substantially different position and has a raft of supranational 
obligations that means it has far less scope for action – even operating under the presumption 
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that Dublin wishes to deviate from EU integration for the sake of the CTA. Further, as an 
international arrangement other, newer, obligations may supersede the CTA, for instance 
Ireland’s continued EU membership. EU membership is also in the Irish Constitution and 
Ireland’s continued mandate to remain a member is sustained through various referenda. 
While the CTA in and of itself is not hugely problematic as it is more about rights of citizens in 
both states, we cannot return to the status quo ante either and it does not resolve trade 
issues. 
With regard to social security coordination the exemption under Protocol 20 does not negate 
that there is an obligation under EU law for all EU member states to extend benefits stemming 
from bilateral agreements that fall within the scope of EU law to all EU nationals.3 In other 
words, if an Irish worker travels to the UK (under the CTA) and collects social security there and 
that social security collection is transportable back to Ireland for aggregation purposes, the 
same would have to happen to a French or a German worker in the UK who collects social 
security (under UK law) and then moves to Ireland. This will require social security coordinating 
mechanisms that are very similar to those currently required under EU law (ie Regulation 
883/2004) in the UK as well as in Ireland, so the information can be easily passed on.  
Any further ‘firming up’ of the CTA will similarly have to be weighed against Protocol 20 – the 
Protocol permits better treatment for UK nationals in Ireland and Irish nationals in the UK than 
for all other EU nationals, but where rights extended are equivalent to those applicable under 
EU law, they have to then be mirrored out to all other EU nationals. 
The EU’s position is that preservation of the CTA is basically at the will of the UK – if it sets up 
hard borders, the CTA becomes more difficult; if it does not, the CTA will survive as it is not 
incompatible with EU law at the moment (and there is an exemption in Protocol 20 at the 
moment). This really would only change if the UK wished to prevent movement of non-Irish 
EEA nationals in the future at the border. The UK Government’s current proposals point away 
from border enforcement and instead indicate that the internal enforcement of the ‘end of 
free movement’ will take place in the UK (through mechanisms such as landlord and employer 
checks on rights to work or to residency).4 
Critically, the UK and Irish Governments have now spent a tremendous amount of time 
unpicking the CTA and although some questions remain over what legal provisions relate to 
the CTA and what do not, the obligations owed to each other’s nationals are perhaps the 
clearest they have been since 1921. As it stands the CTA is a tangle of statutes, statutory 
instruments, practice and one treaty limited to social security provision. To ensure its longevity 
and to provide security for Irish people resident in the UK (including those from Northern 
Ireland only holding Irish passports and not wishing to claim their UK passport) and UK citizens 
from Britain in Ireland, the legal obligations contained in the CTA should now be placed into a 
treaty between the UK and Ireland.  
It took many months to ascertain the full scope of the CT post-Brexit. The CTA in its 
uncodified form is ripe to be misunderstood and some policy makers continue to speak as if 
it is all that is necessary to maintain an open border between Ireland and Northern Ireland 
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after Brexit. The full extent of the CTA urgently needs to be clarified in a bilateral treaty 
between the UK and Ireland  
3. The Brave New World of World Trade Law 
Brexit changes the basis on which the UK, and necessarily Northern Ireland, trades regionally 
and globally. The nature of the Northern Ireland border therefore becomes significant. One of 
the key bodies in ascertaining how the border might work is the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO).5 The WTO is an international organisation aiming to reduce all barriers to 
trade. It achieves this by acting as a forum for countries to constantly re-negotiate to remove 
blocks they have on trade. These re-negotiations are called Rounds. Set up in 1995, the WTO is 
a young organisation by international law standards. Before this the GATT (General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade) coordinated international trade but without a permanent organisation to 
support it. At the WTO decisions are generally made by consensus (the EU has a block vote of 
28, soon to be 27). The WTO has 164 members.6 The EU is the only organisation to be a 
member of the WTO. All EU member states are also individual members but they always vote 
as the EU bloc. So, the EU’s voting and other obligations are entirely bound together, there is 
no discretion to act individually. All other members are states or, like Hong Kong, have 
separate membership of the WTO to their status within a country. 
a) Trading on WTO terms or WTO default rules 
The WTO does not have a set of minimum tariffs or rules with which each country must 
comply. Instead, it has two main elements. 
First, it requires each country to set out a list of its tariff rates for each product and each trade 
barriers for all services. Each tariff or barrier set for a product and service is subject to 
negotiation with each other member of the WTO. Whether another member seeks to 
negotiate these tariffs or other potential trade restrictions depends upon whether they have 
an interest in that product. So, if you make jeans you are interested in cotton tariffs but 
probably not interested in yams if hardly anyone in your country eats them. 
For large trading states like the USA, China or Brazil these lists or schedules can be extremely 
long. The EU has a single schedule for all its members and it is quite extensive.  
Second, the WTO requires states to apply their individual schedules, and non-tariff rules on 
packaging or licensing etc., in a non-discriminatory way. 
b) Most-Favoured Nation and National Treatment rules 
This non-discrimination breaks down into two basic rules. The first, Most-Favoured Nation, 
means you must give whatever your best treatment is for foreign products coming into your 
country to all members of the WTO. For example, if a country cut the tariff on imports of 
copper from 10% to 5% for exporters from one country, it would have to charge 5% to every 
other country as well. 
The second basic rule, National Treatment, means that you must give your best internal 
conditions to foreign products or services. For example, if you do not require domestic 
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products to have a warning as to sugar content in food you cannot require it of foreign 
products. 
These requirements are set out in detail in the WTO’s core treaties: GATT (General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade), GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services) and TRIPs (Trade Related 
Intellectual Property Rights). There is, however, an important exception. Parties to a customs 
union or free trade area can treat products and services produced within that area better than 
they treat those of other WTO members. The EU is an example of a customs union. EFTA is an 
example of a Free Trade Area. The rise of Mega Regionals such as TTIP and TPP provide further 
examples of such deep integration.  
The main purpose of the WTO is to be a forum for negotiation. While the WTO is seen by its 
members to work well, it is worth bearing in mind that its negotiations are long and arduous.  
But the WTO remains the quickest way to get things done – once you negotiate down one 
barrier it goes down for 163 other countries, meaning bigger global effects. National treatment 
prevents you from sneakily undoing that commitment by referencing your domestic products. 
But, because of the ramifications for products, countries are slow to remove their most 
important forms of protection. There is a clear distinction between the WTO default rules that 
the UK might be reliant upon and the trade deals that it aims to negotiate post Brexit albeit in 
the context of mega regionals the new trade environment is probably more complex than is 
presented. 
c) Default Rules  
We should be clear what the so-called default WTO rules actually would mean. 
First there is a question about what default rules we would be talking about.  
The EU has a schedule of concessions – a single list of tariff rates and non-tariff barriers (red 
tape of a kind) which currently acts simultaneously as the UK’s schedule of concessions. So, the 
default rules are the EU rules – it’s the EU’s Schedule. 
But this is not as straightforward as it sounds. Upon Brexit, there are two options as the UK 
needs to establish its place within the WTO, not as a new member, but in an entirely sui 
generis position. 
1. All members of the WTO including the EU agree that the UK continues with the EU’s 
Schedule and re-negotiates over time. 
2. Members decide that the UK should not be entitled to use the EU’s schedule and must re-
negotiate its own with all members due to the change in circumstances.  
While the Director General of the WTO, Roberto Azevêdo, has been clear that it wishes to be 
accommodating there is no clear agreement as to what that might entail. It is also worth 
stressing that this is probably not up to the WTO as an organisation, but rather up to the 
Member States of the WTO – who are the sole decision-makers within the WTO. 
Julian Braithwaite the UK Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the WTO, set out how 
the UK was going about the smooth transition at the WTO: 
There is a process in the WTO that allows the UK to submit new schedules. But they can 
only be adopted – or certified – and thus replace our existing EU schedules if none of 
the WTO’s other 163 members object to them. So to minimise any grounds for 




objection, we plan to replicate our existing trade regime as far as possible in our new 
schedules. Before we take any formal steps in the WTO we will hold extensive informal 
consultations with the WTO membership. Every member will have an opportunity to 
raise any issues or concerns with us before we proceed.7 
There are plans by the EU and UK to submit a plan to the WTO about how they envisage this 
happening, however, this is also reliant on broader Brexit negotiations moving forward and the 
other members’ reactions: 
The international trading community faces many uncertainties - notably over Brexit, 
which will have implications for the EU's trading partners and the EU’s WTO Schedule of 
Commitments. In this regard, Members expected that any process to make adjustments 
to the Schedule of the EU as a result of Brexit would be open, transparent, WTO-
compliant, and include consultations with third countries.8 
For Northern Ireland, agriculture and agricultural products is clearly an important issue. 
Indonesia asked the WTO’s Agriculture Committee about how the UK would handle its 
agricultural tariff system and preferential trade scheme for poorer countries after Brexit, and 
the United States, Argentina, China and Russia all registered interest in the answer. The EU 
answer was basically that this depended on the negotiations. Agriculture is a perennial 
difficulty for the WTO and was one of the main reasons for the failure of the Doha Round.  
If the Schedules for Goods and Services remain as with the EU until they are re-negotiated 
there remains a significant impact. If there is no unique ‘Northern Ireland’ solution, no special 
border solution and no trade deal with the EU the ‘default’ rules have significant 
consequences. 
It is easy to assume that such changes will only hit business and not the private consumer, 
however, this is only a partial view. For instance, just as gifts above a certain value from the US 
are subject to customs, packages sent between relatives in Ireland and Northern Ireland would 
also have to pay. Personal items are ordinarily exempted from border charges; but anyone 
operating a small business, or moving products across the border for work purposes, would 
need to declare what those products are and pay levies on them according to the EU’s WTO 
tariffs.  
While a lot of products come with a 0% tariff, not all sectors benefit from ‘free’ imports and 
exports. Cigarettes and cigars, for instance, are hit with a 33-58% import duty. A wide variety 
of consumer products, such as make-up and personal hygiene items, textiles and basic building 
construction items (such as doors and windows) face import charges of between 4 and 8%. 
Clothing is generally met with import duties ranging from 8 to 17%, and cars face import duties 
of 10-20% depending on their size and purpose.9  
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In the end, as import tariffs are always pushed onto the consumer within the purchasing price, 
many products moving across the border could suddenly become anywhere from 5% to 25% 
more expensive. 
The impact upon the agri-food and farming sector is particularly revealing. Most agricultural 
products and livestock are subject to EU import tariffs of between 6% and 22%. UK agri-food 
products would either have to compete with heavily subsided EU produce on the global market 
by reducing their basic costs in order to be competitively priced, or target sales within the UK 
to avoid import duties. It is likely that suppliers will use the cheapest available option which, 
due to CAP subsidies, may very well still be EU products, even with the imposition of UK tariffs 
on imports from the EU.  
The devaluation of the pound against major global currencies might rescue domestic 
producers, as the price of foreign products will feel higher due to the weak purchasing power 
of sterling. This might - to a minor extent and in the short-term – push customers towards 
buying British. 
But of course, beyond tariffs there are other measures such as Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS) that most countries require for the export of both live produce and agri-food 
products.10 To maintain access, it may be that third countries require that the UK maintains the 
standards it had with the EU to continue access – and guarantee that products which have to 
adhere to lower standards – for instance coming from the US – do not transit through the UK 
and ‘become’ UK produce. An example, perhaps, would be US chlorinated chicken transiting 
through the UK into the EU market and undercutting equivalents such as Moy Park. 
Devaluation of the currency is, of course, of no comfort to businesses which cannot source 
elements of their production line within the UK and which will be liable for a double hit: more 
expensive imports as a result of the weak pound, and being subject to a period of uncertainty 
about what the UK’s import tariffs will eventually be. 
A triple element of jeopardy might be added for such global companies with complex supply 
chains: if they wish to export their final product back into the EU or global markets, they might 
be hit by import tariffs to get their product to its final destination. Bombardier, Caterpillar, 
Fujitsu and DuPont are all examples of companies in exactly such a position. The rules of origin 
with the WTO are quite complex but are clear in determining where a product is actually made.  
Services are obviously a key sector for the London economy and are critical to the national 
economy. Under the EU free movement of services rules, both to set up a business abroad and 
to work (whether for a day, a week, or a year) in many sectors is relatively straightforward. 
Post Brexit, under the WTO, these would be covered by GATS which is significantly less open to 
services movement than the EU is. Non-EU nationals living in the UK and temporarily staying 
and working in the EU, unless they are in senior management, will find far more barriers to 
travel. Post-Brexit, virtually all UK nationals would need to satisfy national immigration 
requirements to temporarily stay and work in any of the 27 EU Member States. In principle this 
could include Ireland, however the CTA may assist in this specific regard for Irish nationals 
moving to the UK (but not necessarily vice versa). 
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Elements of the CTA, with EU agreement, might permit some differences within Ireland but 
this will be the subject of tricky negotiations and it may have to meet the criteria of a Free 
Trade Area under WTO rules to be an exception to GATS. 
d) Conclusion 
Resort to the default WTO rules, sometimes refered to as a ‘cliff edge’ exit from the EU, would 
have an immediate and significant impact on Northern Ireland, both on industry and 
consumers. Even with the maintenance of the CTA and of EU citizenship rights for individuals 
born in Northern Ireland, trade in goods and services, particularly agricultural and agri-food 
products, will be affected.  
While the actual outcome will probably be on a spectrum from staying in the Common Market 
to the WTO default rules, any exit agreement closer to the WTO spectrum will lead to a 
significant re-adjustment to the realities of trading outside of the EU buffer. The heft the EU 
had as 28 bloc (and then 27), with three of the ten biggest economies in the world still in the 
bloc, remains significant. The UK is, of course, also amongst the 10 biggest economies, but its 
negotiating position within the WTO will not be the equivalent of what it is for as long as it 
remains part of the EU’s much bigger (indeed the world’s biggest) market. 
The assumption persists that the UK will be able to retain existing trade deals negotiated 
whilst it was part of the EU after Brexit. But other WTO member states could object to such 
arrangements even if the UK and EU are in agreement on this position. Only if the UK 
pursues a model of Brexit which sees it maintain the Single Market and EU Customs Union 
can these risks be averted.  
4. The Brave New World of the Ireland-Northern Ireland or UK-EU Land Border 
The UK’s negotiation positions are mutually exclusive; it is not possible to simultaneously exit 
both the EUCU and the Single Market and fully avoid a physical border. The desire for no 
special treatment for Northern Ireland in terms of the EUCU makes this more complicated. By 
maintaining this red line, the UK as a whole will have to set up highly EU-compliant customs 
arrangements; not merely a customs agreement, but one that obviates the need for any 
border controls, in order to keep the border fully ‘open’. The EU does not have such an 
arrangement with any third party, and were it to establish one with the UK it would probably 
require the UK signing up to the EU regulatory regime but without any particular input into 
that regulatory regime. This is not just a customs regulatory issue; other questions such as data 
protection to ensure access to data sharing/information exchange and e-customs systems will 
also come into play. 
Regulatory differences create borders. Differences in agricultural or environmental standards 
will have significant impact on import/export ability – not only in the sense of it becoming 
more expensive, but genuinely in the sense of ‘is it still going to be possible’. Mutual 
recognition of standards – or regulatory equivalence – would need to become part of any 
future FTA between the UK and the EU in order to work. As trade is outside of the CTA, Ireland 
does not stand alone in those FTA negotiations. 
Customs does not cover mutual recognition of standards. The EU and Turkey have a customs 
union; it does not preclude border checks on a wide variety of Turkish products. Even the 
EEA/EFTA countries, which are within the single market to a significant extent, do not fully 




escape having physical borders with EU member states. These borders differ in how ‘hard’ to 
‘light touch’ they are – but infrastructure would need to be there, because even where 
negotiations permit most products to cross borders, it would need to be verified on an ongoing 
basis that the relevant products meet the agreed-upon standards. 
The concerns over chlorinated chicken which surfaced in the summer of 2017 are illustrative. 
This US agricultural practice is not permitted in the EU. Chlorinated chicken consequently 
cannot enter the EU. If the UK loosens that restriction subsequent to Brexit in any trade deal 
with the US, it will find trading with the EU significantly more complicated – businesses seeking 
to move chicken from the UK into the EU would have to prove it was EU-appropriate chicken. 
Therefore both chlorinated chicken and all other chicken – if they could in technical terms be 
kept separate – would need to be distinguishable, or alternatively the EU would have to start 
accepting chlorinated chicken (which is highly unlikely in terms of its established animal 
welfare standards).11 
Differences in environmental standards could have further knock-on consequences, as they 
may also impact heavily on the ability for UK companies – including from Northern Ireland in 
projects in Ireland – to participate in other EU projects. For instance, environmental 
considerations can be taken into account in the award of public procurement contracts, and if 
the UK did not sustain EU-level environmental standards in the future, a system would need to 
be developed to ensure that individual contractors could prove they met the EU standards 
(and were not therefore able to undercut EU suppliers on this basis). This, again, is a trade 
barrier. It is not one that can be negated outside of mutual recognition of standards, which is 
what would drop away if EU and UK policy in any area started to differ. 
At present the UK Government promises to have appropriate regulations but this is not the 
same as being legally bound to have those regulations. The EU Treaties mandate those 
regulations apply within member states. But given that the UK is aiming to have regulatory 
independence, another source of law will need to replace the EU Treaties but be of an equally 
binding nature in order to guarantee to the EU that UK products meet the agreed-upon 
requirements. This will, undoubtedly, involve another form of Treaty – which will require a 
supervisory authority of some kind. And, where such bilateral agreements exist between the 
EU and third countries, there are always custom checks to ensure that the agreements that 
exist operate appropriately in practice. 
A Seanad Report suggested the following measures for the Ireland/Northern Ireland border 
post Brexit:  
1. a pre-clearance model for goods as part of a solution, whereby trucks and drivers can pass 
through the UK land-bridge without incurring duties or checks.  
2. A system of pre-registering loads online and tracking using GPS or number plate 
recognition is a possible solution for trade with Britain and Northern Ireland.12  
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But even with these solutions anti-abuse measures need to be put in place, including mobile 
spot-checks of goods to check compliance. 
The UK Government currently proposes a ‘cross-border trade exemption’ for small 
businesses.13 This would require all traders to be identifiable in one way or another and to be 
‘sorted’ according to what level of checks are required for them at, presumably, the border. 
Such a scheme may also be heavily sectoral and will be dependent on definitions of ‘small 
traders’ – does this include farmers, and if so, what size of farm will count as ‘small’? 
Moreover, small businesses regularly rely upon large courier companies to make cross-border 
deliveries, which makes policing such an arrangement particularly complex. There will be 
significant regulation in place to make such an ‘exemption’ workable and to ensure that the 
products in question meet the EU standards needed for import to be at all possible. Even 
under such an arrangement small businesses will therefore experience increased regulation, 
even if it is not at the border. 
Any approach which does not involved the UK remaining within the EU Single Market and the 
EU Customs Union will result in the imposition of some physical border controls because the 
legal guarantees of regulatory equivalence, mutual recognition, and non-barriers will require 
checks. The extent of these checks depends upon both the solution found for Northern Ireland 
and the relationship the rest of the UK has with the EU. Currently, there is no technology out 
there that could get rid of the need for spot checks given the UK Government’s wish to leave 
the Single Market and Custom’s Union. The extent of the border remains negotiable, but given 
the UK’s current negotiating position and ‘red lines’, it is very difficult to perceive a route 
towards a seamless border. 
The UK negotiating position has floated the possibility of the EU ignoring the Northern 
Ireland/Ireland land border for external tariffs (as happens at the EU’s borders with micro 
states). But the this would create a back door into the EU market and prevent the EU from 
fulfilling its WTO obligations. Examples of EU border arrangements with third countries which 
are larger economies give more realistic pictures of post-Brexit possibilities: 
Turkey and the EU: This approach does not cover all goods and requires extensive checks on 
the cross-border movement of goods (relying on transport permits).14 It does provide for 
common external tariffs, however, and the UK would have to agree to these as part of a 
customs agreement solution.15  
Sweden/Norway: The EEA does not cover agricultural goods which would present a 
considerable difficulty for Northern Ireland’s cross-border supply chains in the agri-food 
industry. When it comes to border management, the EEA agreement provides for customs 
cooperation and mutual assistance, including detailed provisions on issues such as common 
standards and mutual recognition as regards customs security measures. In the context of the 
land border between Norway and Sweden, a bilateral agreement dating from 1959 (and 
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applicable subsequent to Sweden’s EU accession16) aims at reducing bureaucracy and 
duplication while still managing border crossings effectively: for example, providing for a 
common border zone where each country’s customs authorities can operate freely across both 
territories.17 However, it is clear from the Norway example that EEA membership does not 
negate border checks altogether – there are multiple customs check points at border crossings, 
and these do not only engage in spot-checks for commercial traffic. 
Switzerland/Germany: Switzerland has a special starting position in that it is a member of the 
Schengen area albeit it is not part of the European Union Customs Union. Due to this fact, 
customs controls continue. Both countries carry out some checks at the crossings – even on 
goods transported by individuals on vacation, to ensure they do not violate the personal 
allowances permitted under the EUCU and Swiss law. Even though technically Switzerland does 
not control the movement of people, the line between controlling traffic of people and goods 
is hard to draw – stopping a truck for customs reasons is likely to also result in an ID check for 
its drivers. Beyond that, because of the dual role of Swiss customs officials, who also act as 
border police, they are required to carry out ID checks for security issues, and not just at fixed 
border points but also via mobile units that operate along the border.18  
Bosnia Herzegovina/Croatia: When Croatia joined the EU in 2013, the bloc’s external frontier 
was redrawn along the country’s borders with Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
Montenegro. The border with Bosnia and Herzegovina has proved particularly troublesome. 
Both were once republics of Yugoslavia, and 15% of Bosnian citizens are ethnic Croats, most of 
whom have Croatian EU passports. All non-EU citizens (including most Bosnians) are subject to 
passport controls at this border to the EU. However, the EU agreed to a system of permits 
allowing locals unhindered travel across the border. Prime Minister Theresa May has argued 
that examples like this show that the EU shows imagination in dealing with tricky border issues 
in the past – but easy access is not the same as the full absence of a border. Croatia, upon 
accession, had to build new border posts and is required to perform numerous checks on 
goods from Bosnia. Exceptions also do not come without strings attached: for Bosnia to benefit 
from an EU-permitted exception to border controls so that it can easily access its primary port 
(which is now in Croatian territory) to export agricultural goods, Bosnia has had to agree to 
comply with the relevant EU regulations on those agricultural products.19  
East/West Germany: The Seanad considered a protocol that then-West Germany negotiated 
following the ratification of the Treaty of Rome in 1957: this protocol permitted trade between 
East and West Germany to be treated as ‘internal’ trade, rather than cross-border trade. 
Subsequent treaties, including ones establishing the European [Union] Customs Union, did not 
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negate this protocol; it became obsolete once Germany was reunified.20 The Senead suggests 
this may be a potential precedent for Northern Ireland, as a protocol could be drafted to 
designate Northern Ireland as being part of an ‘internal’ trade area with Ireland. However, such 
an accommodation would be very difficult politically and given the terms of the GFA with 
regard to the people of Northern Ireland determining their own future status, it would likely be 
contested. 
The UK remaining within the EU Single Market and the EU Customs Union after Brexit would 
be the best outcome in terms of minimising friction at the EU’s new external border in 
Northern Ireland. The UK Government currently rejects this option, but its proposed 
solutions do not take account of the EU’s need to protect its international obligations with 
regard to its trading borders. The UK Government’s hints towards mutual non-enforcement 
of these rules (or an enforcement regime curtailed by loopholes) is tantamount to asking the 
EU to ignore its own legal duties,. It is an illusory, rather than “imaginative”, solution to the 
border. 
5. The Brave New World of Human Rights  
The Good Friday/Belfast Agreement means that leaving the EU carries with it different 
challenges in terms of necessary human rights protection for Northern Ireland than for the rest 
of the UK. Although the short-term possibility of the UK withdrawing from the European 
Convention of Human Rights has receded as Brexit sucks in so much of Westminster’s 
legislative energy, the GFA requires broad equivalence for rights protections on the island of 
Ireland and Brexit opens up a possibility for divergence. 
Differing human rights provisions, due to devolution, are not without precedent in the UK and 
this element of UK constitutional structure may prove significant. The Guiding Principles 
transmitted by the Commission to EU27 for the Dialogue on Ireland/Northern Ireland the EU 
states that: 
The European Union and the United Kingdom, as a co-guarantor with Ireland of the 
Good Friday Agreement, should continue to support peace, stability and reconciliation 
on the island of Ireland … 
The Good Friday Agreement includes provisions on Rights, Safeguards and Equality of 
Opportunity, for which European Union law and practice has provided a supporting 
framework in Northern Ireland and across the island. The Good Friday Agreement 
requires equivalent standards of protection of rights in Ireland and Northern Ireland. 
The United Kingdom should ensure that no diminution of rights is caused by the United 
Kingdom’s departure from the European Union, including in the area of protection 
against forms of discrimination currently enshrined in Union.21 
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While the GFA specifically references the European Convention on Human Rights and this is 
where much of the focus is, as the EU has pointed out equivalence of rights in general (not just 
civil and political rights) across the island is required.  
Equivalence does not require the law to be exactly the same – for instance the law on same sex 
marriage is different across the island – however equivalence could potentially require that at 
least within Northern Ireland, human rights protection that emerges from the EU and not the 
Council of Europe may need to be maintained in some form. In the Annex to the GFA the 
equivalence is mentioned with specific reference to the Republic stating that ‘[t]he measures 
brought forward would ensure at least an equivalent level of protection of human rights as will 
pertain in Northern Ireland’.22 This could be interpreted in reverse, meaning that a diminution 
of rights in Northern Ireland would permit the Republic to do the same -- however this would 
defeat the object and purpose of the GFA that was intended to create an ECHR-plus for 
Northern Ireland in the context of EU membership. Ireland will obviously maintain its ECHR-
plus position. 
The biggest issue is therefore the Charter of Fundamental Rights (but could potentially also 
include broader rights that are foundational to the EU, such as workers’ rights). It would seem 
reasonable as an interpretation to suggest that post Brexit the rights that Irish citizens enjoy as 
EU citizens within the EU would continue and be enforceable within the EU even if they 
originate in Northern Ireland and these EU citizens also hold UK passports. That seems to be 
the clear position of all parties to the negotiations.  
The difficulty arises if a discrepancy arises between those rights that emerge from EU that are 
applied in the Republic but are removed subsequent to Brexit. At present, the status quo 
means there is no issue under the GFA. However, post-Brexit it is possible that the UK may 
choose to lessen its rights protections that are solely under the Charter (elements of digital 
protection for instance) thus diminishing the equivalence. Post Brexit, the EU could also 
upscale its rights protection opening a gap between Ireland and the UK. The most extreme 
example could be both moving towards opposite ends of the spectrum (the EU/Ireland 
creating more rights, the UK fewer) creating an equivalence gap which could impact upon the 
GFA. This is a real risk in the context of Brexit; given that the removal of so-called red tape was 
a prominent justification for Brexit, this poses a long-term risk to workplace rights and gender 
equality protections (even if they are initially retained in UK law through the Withdrawal Bill). 
The Charter of Fundamental Freedoms is intended to be complementary to the ECHR:  
In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the 
meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said 
Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive 
protection.23 
The ECHR is a baseline and the Charter provides more extensive protection – a form of ECHR-
plus for the EU (it is a more modern rights document and provides a more principled basis for 
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dealing with areas of law which have developed since the ECHR was concluded in the 1950s, 
such as data protection law). The Charter has a range of civil, political, social and economic 
rights, under six chapters: Dignity, Freedom, Equality, Solidarity, Citizen’s Rights and Justice. 
The Charter contains both civil and political and socio-economic rights and several are specific 
to the Charter. For example, the right to the protection of personal data and to dignity, 
provisions on gender equality in employment, work and pay. A Parliamentary Select 
Committee has emphasised that the Charter does at present have direct effect in the UK, albeit 
only as it applies to areas that fall within the scope of EU law.24  
Clause 5 of the EU Withdrawal Bill, as introduced, potentially prevents the Charter from having 
this function over “retained” areas of EU law: 
 cl.5(4) The Charter of Fundamental Rights is not part of domestic law on or after exit 
day. 
cl.5(5) Subsection (4) does not affect the retention in domestic law on or after exit day 
in accordance with this Act of any fundamental rights or principles which exist 
irrespective of the Charter (and references to the Charter in any case law are, so far as 
necessary for this purpose, to be read as if they were references to any corresponding 
retained fundamental rights or principles). 
As clause 5(4) of the Withdrawal Bill indicates, it must be remembered that EU law contains 
principles and rights beyond the Charter, many of which prima facie be transposed into UK law 
under the EU Withdrawal Bill: 
 The Treaty of Lisbon under Article 3(3) includes children’s rights. The UK is in 
Convention on Rights of the Child as a State so the GFA equivalence should not be 
affected unless the EU went far beyond the UN Convention.  
 The EU has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities. UK has its own ratification of this too. Similarly the GFA equivalence 
should not be affected unless the EU went far beyond the UN Convention. 
 The Charter also covers areas such as data protection, privacy and human cloning 
as well as issues around Elder law. 
 EU Secondary legislation covers asylum (Directive 2013/32/EU) and victim’s rights 
(Directive 2012/29/EU). 
 Gender equality has also been a significant element of EU law. The TEU under 
articles 2 and 3 provides for the elimination of inequality and the promotion of 
equality between men and women.25  
Even so, if a right is only found in the Charter and not specifically converted into UK law then it 
could be lost to domestic law on Brexit. The Government has not recognised this as a concern, 
with the White Paper on Brexit maintaining that: 
The Charter applies to EU Member States only when they are acting within the scope of 
EU law, its relevance to the UK will be ‘removed’ by the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. 
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The Charter should not be used to bring challenges against the Government over EU 
rights like the right to vote or stand as a candidate in European Parliament elections 
that will be lost as a result of withdrawal from the EU, or as the basis for striking down 
UK legislation after withdrawal. As the Charter was not designed to create any new 
rights or alter the circumstances in which individuals could rely on fundamental rights, 
removal of the Charter from UK law ‘will not affect the substantive rights that 
individuals already benefit from in the UK’.26 
The Charter does, however, enunciate principles which underpin areas of current EU 
competence regarding data protection and social rights. The current Withdrawal Bill proposals 
intend to strip away the Charter and the principles contained therein but retain (initially at 
least) the substantive elements of these areas of law. Data protection law is, to take one 
example, an essential facet of the right to privacy, but because of the nature of EU law the 
relevant principles are much better developed within the Charter (Article 8 and 52) than under 
the ECHR (Article 8); ‘Article 8 of the Charter concerns a fundamental right which is distinct 
from that enshrined in Article 7 of the Charter and which has no equivalent in the ECHR’.27 The 
approach set out in clause 5 and clause 6(7) of the Withdrawal Bill creates the potential for 
gaps to emerge between rights enjoyed in Northern Ireland and in the Republic, and may even 
lead to their being non-equivalent in GFA terms. Of course, this entirely depends on how these 
rights develop in practice after Brexit.  
Parliament should therefore take steps to introduce additional protections into domestic law 
to ensure that the absence of the Charter within the domestic framework does not undermine 
GFA compliance. Several proposed amendments to the Withdrawal Bill attempt this feat. Some 
target the issue of GFA compliance directly. Amendments 144-147, proposed by the leadership 
of the Liberal Democrats, seek to restrict the ability of ministers to employ statutory 
instruments under clause 7 to 9 to act in a way which could undermine legislation consequent 
upon GFA. The impetus behind this protection is important, but the focus upon consequent 
legislation is misplaced in the human rights context given that the GFA requires an equivalence 
standard to be applied to human rights protections in Ireland/Northern Ireland as a whole.28 
Moreover, these amendments miss their target if clause 5 has by force of statute undermined 
the human rights equivalence that the GFA requires.29  
Nor is the EU passive in this process. The UK Government has frequently claimed that it is 
seeking a comprehensive agreement with the EU after Brexit (bringing in aspects such as 
security in addition to trade). With regard to Northern Ireland, this has even stretched to 
proposing that the EU continue to provide funding under its PEACE stream after Brexit.30 For 
the EU, however, a comprehensive agreement would likely also involve data protection, 
human rights and possibly workers’ rights (at the very least to minimise the potential that 
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companies operating in the UK and trading into the EU under any Brexit agreement could use a 
lack of such safeguards to undercut their EU-based competitors). The EU and Canada, for 
example, made reciprocal human rights commitments as part of preamble to CETA. The EU is, 
indeed, under treaty obligation to conduct its foreign policy respect the principles of 
‘democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity …’.31 
Shared EU membership has applied a gloss over domestic policy differences between the UK 
and Ireland as the same supranational standards could be identified as the reciprocal rights 
framework. This now changes. The effect of clause 5 will inhibit the UK courts’ efforts to 
draw upon Charter principles and related CJEU jurisprudence to secure continued equivalent 
compliance as encapsulated in the GFA. This provision should therefore be amended to 
specifically protect this GFA requirement, which the EU could indeed regard as an important 
goal of a “comprehensive” Brexit agreement. 
6. The Brave New World of EU Citizenship 
The UK Government’s paper on Northern Ireland maintains that: 
The UK welcomes the commitment in the European Commission’s directives that these 
EU rights should continue to be respected following the UK’s departure from the EU: 
“Full account should be taken of the fact that Irish citizens residing in Northern Ireland 
will continue to enjoy rights as EU citizens”.   
The problem with this as a legal starting point is that it is a fudge. Irish citizens residing in 
Northern Ireland will have EU citizen rights – but they will be resident outside of the EU. An 
analogous example could be a UK national currently living in the United States (or any non-
member state), in which case they have no ability to exercise their EU citizenship rights for as 
long as their residency of a non-member state continues.  
In terms of the four freedoms, the United States example indicates passive enjoyment at best. 
Post Brexit, an Irish citizen living in Northern Ireland retains the right to live elsewhere in the 
EU – and once they exercise that right to move, the full ambit of the four freedoms and EU 
citizenship rights will apply to them again.  However, while they remain resident in Northern 
Ireland, there is very little in EU citizenship rights that they can concretely benefit from.32  In 
fact, nearly all rights stemming from the EU’s ‘four freedoms’ are conditional on moving to 
another Member State: see, for instance, the freedom to establish a business in another 
Member State.33 However, those few rights that do not require movement to another Member 
State will no longer apply to EU nationals resident in Northern Ireland once it is no longer part 
of a Member State.  Key here is the freedom to provide services, which is contingent on living 
in a Member State and providing a service to another Member State.34  While service provision 
will presumably be covered under the CTA and bilateral agreements vis-à-vis Ireland, 
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individuals from Northern Ireland will not be able to provide services to the rest of the EU 
unless they are resident in an EU state with Irish nationality – as opposed to resident in the UK 
with Irish nationality, or resident in Ireland with UK nationality.  
While not exactly analogous, Faroe Island residents demonstrate the consequences of Brexit 
for Irish passport holders in the UK. While they possess Danish passports, they cannot exercise 
EU citizenship rights unless resident in Denmark (or elsewhere in the EU). Having an EU 
passport while residing outside the EU, such as on the Faroe Islands, does not enable you to 
exercise your EU rights fully.  
All of this means that while Irish citizens living in Northern Ireland would have ‘dormant’ free 
movement rights that a UK citizen would not have, these rights have very limited impact within 
Northern Ireland. The one possible exception here is European Parliament voting rights – 
where Ireland could make this right available to Irish nationals living outside of Ireland, but 
currently does not.  This means that even this EU citizenship right, which does not have to be 
limited by residency in a Member State, would not continue to be enjoyed by Irish nationals 
living in Northern Ireland. 
A possible alternative to this ‘loss’ of EU rights for those resident in Northern Ireland is a 
bespoke arrangement with the EU in which Northern Ireland will be treated as if a territory of 
a Member State.  This would be unprecedented, but if successfully negotiated, it results in 
further, rather than fewer, problems for UK-Irish relations.  For one, the principle of consent 
under the Good Friday Agreement precludes changes to the territorial status of Northern 
Ireland without agreement from both Irish and Northern Irish voters, so pushing through such 
a ‘status’ change via a treaty may be ill-advised.35  Secondly, the equivalence of rights 
mandated by the Good Friday Agreement would run into significant problems if those born in 
Northern Ireland choosing to hold an Irish passport had the full extent of EU citizenship rights, 
but those born in Northern Ireland choosing to hold a UK passport did not.  Finally, it is also 
highly doubtful that the EU would agree to extend such treatment to Irish passport holders in 
Northern Ireland without demanding it be replicated for all other EU nationals resident in 
Northern Ireland.  The loss of ‘active’ EU citizenship rights for Irish nationals in Northern 
Ireland, consequently, seems to be the simpler solution – but must be adequately prepared for 
and communicated to those Irish nationals sooner rather than later. 
Clarity on what the EU and the UK understand to be the consequence of Irish nationals in 
Northern Ireland retaining their EU citizenship is urgently needed.  If these Irish nationals 
will, like all EU nationals residing outside of the EU, have primarily ‘dormant’ rights that they 
could choose to exercise by moving to the EU, this must be specified by both parties as soon 
as possible so those dependent on EU rights like the free movement of services for business 
purposes can prepare.  If, on the other hand, the EU and the UK wish to negotiate a special 
status for Northern Ireland whereby its territory will be treated as if it were a Member State, 
the consequences of this for both the Good Friday Agreement and all other EU nationals 
resident in Northern Ireland must be anticipated by those negotiations.  
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7. The Brave New World of Devolution 
The EU Withdrawal Bill, as introduced, purports to effect little change to the devolution 
settlement. Clause 11 asserts that retained EU law remains as binding on the competences of 
the devolved institutions as EU law was before it. The Bill purports to make no direct transfers 
of power to any of the devolved institutions. The brave new world of devolution is deliberately 
intended to differ as little as possible from the pre-Brexit arrangements:  
To provide the greatest level of legal and administrative certainty upon leaving the EU, 
and consistent with the approach adopted more generally in legislating for the point of 
departure, the Government intends to replicate the current frameworks provided by EU 
rules through UK legislation.36 
As the Shadow Secretary of State for Exiting the EU recognised on the Bill’s introduction, the 
Bill ‘fails to include a presumption of devolution which would allow effective transfer of 
devolved competencies coming back from the EU to the devolved administrations and makes 
unnecessary and unjustified alterations to the devolution settlements’.37 This insistence that 
(almost) nothing is changing amidst profound change is far from accidental, it is a marker of 
how toxic relations between the UK Government and the devolved institutions have become, 
particularly over the issue of Brexit.  
The UK Supreme Court’s Miller decision affirms that the Westminster Parliament remains able 
to make laws for the devolved parts of the UK, even if they change the nature of devolved 
institutional competences, and that this legal power is unaffected by devolution.38 The Court 
nonetheless recognised that a constitutional convention exists whereby the devolved 
legislatures will normally assent to changes in their competence by means of a Legislative 
Consent Motion (LCM).39 Parliament is therefore under a constitutional duty to gain legislative 
consent motions from the devolved legislatures on changes to their competence (under the 
Sewel Convention, as transposed into statute section 2 of the Scotland Act 2016 and section 2 
of the Wales Act 2017). The drafting of the Wihdrawal Bill indicates that it was conceived with 
the intention of denying that a LCM would be necessary, to head off the possibility of a 
constitutional crisis resulting from Westminster overriding the rejection of a LCM.40  
The Scottish Executive and Welsh Government are eager to see a range of what are currently 
EU competences and related funding, particularly with regard to agriculture, fisheries and 
regional policy, transferred to their remit on the occasion of Brexit.41 The UK Government, 
however, might feel considerable pressure to allocate funding in a radically different way from 
the EU in response to expectations generated by the Vote Leave campaign. Its White Paper has 
certainly indicated an intention to ‘to ensure that more decisions are devolved’, but this leaves 
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open scope for many repatriated competences to be managed by Westminster.42 Northern 
Ireland’s Executive, even before the collapse precipitated by the Renewable Heating Incentive 
scandal, had not clarified its desired outcomes in this regard, likely as a result of the inability of 
the Executive partners to establish an agreed position.  
Relegating devolution issues to the margins of the Withdrawal Bill therefore constitutes an 
effort to avoid triggering the need for LCMs. This effort was doomed to fail; the Bill as it stands 
gives new competences to devolved executive members to address reforms consequent upon 
devolution.43 The UK Government has therefore recognised the need to seek LCMs. But to 
avert a potential constitutional crisis the UK Government needs to recognise the changed 
nature of the UK constitution since devolution and reach agreements with the devolved 
administrations on competence transfers and how to manage areas of shared competence 
which are due to be repatriated.44  
Brexit has considerable implications for the UK’s devolution settlements. Arrangements need 
to be made not only for repatriating powers but for working out how to legislate for new 
shared areas of competence, previously managed at EU level by framework Directives. 
Effective planning for this element of the UK’s post-Brexit Constitution will not happen 
without a constructive partnership between the UK Government and the devolved 
administrations. This necessarily involves restarting devolution in Northern Ireland. 
8. Conclusions 
Brexit necessarily will bring about change for Northern Ireland and the UK; whatever the 
disparate motivations of the majority in June 2016 Brexit was a vote against the status quo. 
The unique impact of that vote upon Northern Ireland has been acknowledged by all relevant 
parties, London, Belfast, Dublin and Brussels. Nonetheless the consequences for Northern 
Ireland of a Brexit which draws the UK away from the Customs Union and Single Market have 
yet to be fully appreciated. Regarding Human Rights protection, if the EU Withdrawal Bill is an 
indication of the Government’s position it does suggest that we will be looking at a changed 
human rights context. This may not necessarily lead to a violation of the GFA, but steps can be 
taken now to protect against this risk. 
Northern Ireland will need to make itself heard – this is particularly important as Stormont 
remains dormant. Contingencies will need to be put in place. Trading in the global WTO 
structure will produce many losers. Significant adjustments will be needed for both small 
businesses like farms but also Northern Ireland’s global manufacturing industries and agri-food 
businesses.  
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